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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

)

vs.

)

GREGORY L. PRESTWICH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRESTWICH

)

Criminal Case No. 041500498 FS

)

Appellant Case No. 20060323 CA

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended), where it involves
an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, which does not involve a
conviction of a capital felony or one in the first degree.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the
confidential informant (hereafter "CI") was not acting as an agent for law
enforcement at the time of her entry into Appellant's residence without a search
warrant?
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in determining that a search
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warrant was unnecessary before the regional drug task force allowed a CI to enter
the residence of Appellant to purchase narcotics in circumstances where the buy
was being controlled through surveillance inside the residence and where there
appears to be no established probable cause or exigent circumstances?
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial erred in finding that the Appellant was
not entrapped in committing the offense as a matter of law?
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict of guilty and whether or not the jury erred in failing to find entrapment under
the circumstances of this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and a standard of "clearly
erroneous" as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774
and State v. Rhoades, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons,
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v.
Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, fl 11, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,
H20, 989 P.2d 52), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Generally, if a case
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involves a mixed question of fact and law, the Court affords some measure of
discretion to the trial court's application of the law. The measure of discretion
afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. See State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1J26, 63 P.3d 670. Little discretion is afforded to the district
court involving issues, such as the reasonableness of search and seizure, where
there must be statewide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial
officials, see State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1f12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen 2002
UT 25, H26). Where issues on appeal present questions of statutory interpretation,
the proper interpretation of the statute is a question of law and reviewed for
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1J17, 977 P.2d 1201. The
Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court but
reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, p , 20 P.3d 300.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes
the following apply:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case involving the issues of
search and seizure and entrapment. The Appellant was arrested after a controlled
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buy in his residence involving a CI where no search warrant had been issued prior
to entry of the CI into the residence or apartment of Appellant. The activity of the CI
was only monitored after she made contact with the Appellant and set up a buy. The
CI was allowed to make contact with whomever she chose in an attempt to find
former friends and affiliates in her world of association with drug using friends for
arranging controlled buys. Appellant was a close enough friend of the CI that they
had prior dealings with each other in the exchange of controlled substances, where
one had provided for the other and vice versa over a history of many years. The CI
set up the buy at the residence of Appellant and exchanged twenty five dollars
($25.00) for approximately three grams of marijuana. The Appellant was later
arrested and in the course of the proceedings brought a motion to suppress,
asserting that the action of law enforcement was improper and violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure. Appellant asserts that law
enforcement failed to obtain a warrant before entering his residence, that there had
been established no probable cause or exigent circumstances and/or that the action
of law enforcement or their CI constituted entrapment as a matter of law. The Court
denied the motion to suppress. The Appellant took the matter to trial on the 2nd day
of February, 2006, and was found guilty.
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: The action in question
took place on or about the 14th day of July, 2004. A warrant for Appellant's arrest
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42

was executed and filed on or about the 21 st day, and an initial appearance was
conducted on or about the 23rd day of September, 2004, and the Appellant was
appointed a public defender. A preliminary hearing was set for the 21 st day of
October, 2004. This was continued to the 10th day of November, 2004, and the
Court after hearing some of the State's evidence signed a bind over order to the
allegations as charged. See the record at 35. The Appellant entered not guilty pleas
thereafter. On or about the 28th day of February, 2005, the matter came before the
Court on a motion to suppress or limit and on or about May 5, 2005, the Court
entered its order denying Appellant's motion to suppress supported by findings of
fact and conclusions of law . See the record at 55 to 65. Appellant went to trial a
year later, on or about the 2nd day of February, 2006, and the jury returned a verdict
of guilty. The judgment, sentence and commitment was entered after sentencing on
the 21 st day of March, 2006, which incorporated a stay of execution of sentence with
order of probation supervised for 36 months and requiring Appellant to serve a term
of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of 150 days with credit for time
served, to complete a substance abuse evaluation and complete any treatment or
aftercare, to complete and pay for a mental health evaluation, consent to the release
of treatment information and to abide by a curfew for the first 30 days. See the
record at 177 to 182. A notice of appeal was filed at the request of appellant on or
about the 3rd day of April, 2006. See the record with its attached Exhibit A at 187 to
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193. The docketing statement was filed on or about the 3rd day of May, 2006.
STATEMENT of FACTS
1. On or about the 14th day of July, 2004, a good friend of Appellant, JAMIE
ODEN, was utilized as a confidential informant or CI in a monitored or controlled buy
at the apartment of Appellant.

The CI initiated the contact and made the

arrangements for the purchase and then the local drug task force went through their
procedure in placing an electronic hearing device on the CI and providing the money
necessary to purchase the marijuana. See the hearing transcript of the 28th day of
February, 2005, at Page 11, in the record at 201.
2. The transaction occurred in the home of the Appellant and the drug task
force, although aware of the transaction being set up, had not bothered to go to the
trouble or effort to secure a search warrant. See the hearing transcript of the 28th
day of February, 2005, at page 40, in the record at 201.
3. The CI was a long-time friend of the Appellant's and with whom each had
shared with the other their own supply of marijuana. Each had been involved in the
other's life at times that were stressful and at times when things were going
pleasantly, in a general sense a good friendship between them, which was
established by experiences manifesting trust and loyalty upon which each had come
to rely.
4. The CI in this case had made several attempts to purchase marijuana from
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the Appellant, before he ultimately sold her three grams of marijuana at a cost of
twenty five dollars ($25.00). See the trial transcript at pages 144-145 in the record
at 208.
5. Appellant's residence was located within one thousand (1,000) feet of a
church and a parking lot and, therefore, the charge was enhanced to a second
degree felony.
6. A motion to suppress was held on or about the 28th day of February, 2005.
The trial judge denied the same, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
the matter went to jury trial, which considered as a jury instruction the defense of
entrapment. The jury found the Appellant guilty and the matter was continued to the
14th day of March, 2006, for sentencing.
7. The Court entered its judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence,
order of probation, and commitment on the 21 st day of March, 2006, by in large
adopting the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P), which
recommendation came as a downward departure from the general matrix that would
have recommended intermediate sanctions under Appellant's circumstances.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
The broad and divergent use of CIs in police action calls for uniform statewide
standards to guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.
Page 8 of
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Fundamental

fairness requires that law enforcement adheres to basic due process by following
established procedures for securing a warrant before entering a private residence.
For warrantless entry into a residence to meet judicial scrutiny, there must be
probable cause or exigent circumstances. The typical CI in this setting is inherently
unreliable, which should be more seriously scrutinized by judicial authority. The
emphasis on agency misdirects the focus of the problem, which is to allow
investigative techniques to delude Fourth Amendment protection to private citizens.
B.
The trial court erred in not suppressing evidence, the State exploiting the
relationship between the CI and the Appellant, which was a long-term close
relationship. Exploitation of such relationships is not often apparent from the present
contact between the parties, where actions and words have greater meaning and
significance. The fact finder erred in not considering such circumstances as part of
the judicial instruction for entrapment and the trial court erred in not granting
Appellant's motion to dismiss or limit. Failure to take such action condones the
inappropriate conduct of law enforcement through its unchecked use of CIs.
C.
The facts and circumstances of Koury and McArthur are different and
distinguishable from those of Appellant's case. Both cases involved circumstances
where permission was granted to the witness before becoming a CI. Both involved
Page 9 of
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circumstances where the CI was simply reporting on events that had already been
perpetuated by the accused. The CI's involvement is that of a passive witness. In
the instant case, the CI is not just reporting but inducing the accused to commit the
criminal act gaining access by false pretense and without a warrant where there is
no probable cause or exigent circumstances, influenced by the pressures of a longterm relationship, factors not readily apparent from the monitored contact.
D.
Good judgment requires proper perspective. Where the focus of procedure
presently looks to factors such as agency and requiring a defendant to establish
entrapment before allowing a jury to consider such as a defense, judicial review and
oversight should focus more closely upon and scrutinize law enforcement techniques
and procedures that pose the greatest risk of deluding fundamental protection to
private citizens such as requiring a search warrant before entering the residence of
an accused. It is unlikely that such protection will result from legislative attention and
the jury, at least without proper focus and instruction on such matters, will likely not
consider factors that would have an impact upon such constitutional protection.
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ARGUMENTS
A.
THE BROAD AND DIVERGENT USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN
POLICE ACTION CALLS FOR UNIFORM STATEWIDE STANDARDS TO
GUIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORIAL OFFICIALS.
The present case is an example of the broad use of CIs by the multi-county
drug task force in southern Utah. It is similar to the cases of State v. Edwards and
State v. Smith1. These cases involve entry into a residence without a search
warrant, and are similar because the CI was not directed by law enforcement, but
rather left to her own devices to set up the Appellant in criminal activity. The cases
are similar in showing various examples relative to how such agents are used, of the
types of efforts employed to entice one into criminal activity. The issue of course,
is whether such conduct constitutes entrapment.
In the prior cases, the use of the CI who was a part of a close or special

lf

The Court decided State v. Edwards, case number 20050112-CA
in April, 2006, as 2006 UT App. 148. Petition for writ of
certiorari was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals thereafter
and is pending further decision. This Court presently has before
it State v. Smith, appellate case number 20050977-CA. At the time
of the filing of this brief, a reply brief had yet to be filed
and the matter has yet to be considered or set for oral argument.
There are factual distinctions between the three cases. However,
the legal arguments are fundamentally and predominately the same.
Counsel for Appellant believes the distinctions are significant
enough to warrant the filing of this brief rather than asserting
the claims to be non-meritorious given the Court of Appeals'
recent decision in State v. Edwards.
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relationship in one form or another and in that regard this case is of the same type.
The Appellant and the CI had a long-term friendship which involved the exchange
and use of marijuana over a period of many years, the two having first met in the
year of 1999. In each case, the amount of leverage applied or the pressure from
enticement cannot be measured merely by the simple words used or the isolated
circumstances of each single incident. This Appellant asserts that it is impossible
to accurately quantify or qualify the kind of influence or pressure that can result from
long-term or special relationships, which is not obvious from the single contact.
Such uncertainty cannot be fully ascertained or measured in a manner that could
establish a consistent standard for implementation and regulation as concerning
potential defendants. However, the Appellant asserts that such a standard can and
should be applied to establish uniform statewide standards for the use of CIs.
Point No. 1
Law Enforcement should Adhere to Basic Due Process by Following
Established Procedures of Securing a Warrant before Entering a Private
Residence.
In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, the Utah Supreme Court addressed this
same issue involving search and seizure within the scope of a traffic stop, and as
part of its analysis, addressed the standard of review. It stated quite appropriately
that in cases involving mixed questions of fact and law, the reviewing court should
afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of the law and this
Page 12 of
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measure of discretion varies according to the issue reviewed. The Supreme Court
then stated:
When a case involves consent to search, we afford little discretion to the district
court because there must be 'statewide standards that guide law enforcement
and prosecutorial officials.' Id. at tf26; see also State v. Truman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1271 (Utah, 1993).
What seemed clear and evident to the Supreme Court on an issue involving
consent in a search of an automobile, is even more overwhelmingly necessary and
evident when the consent to search involves a home or residence of an accused.
In Hansen, the Supreme Court went on to state that statewide standards help ensure
that different trial judges reach the same legal conclusion in cases that have little
factual difference.

Where its analysis involved the legality of the search, the

Supreme Court concluded that the district court's determination of the law was to be
afforded no deference by the reviewing court. Id. The Appellant asserts that the
same standard should be applied in this case. In fact, it is believed by many that
there should be heightened consideration when the search and seizure involves a
warrantless search of a residence or home, and therefore, scrutinized more closely.
In State v.Warren, 2003 UT 36, the Utah Supreme Court saw fit to apply this
standard to a situation involving a Terry Frisk stop, which this Appellant believes in
comparison to be a circumstance of lesser compelling interest.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in that case stated as follows:
When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little
discretion to the trial court because there must be statewide standards that guide
law enforcement and prosecutorial officials (additional citations omitted). Id.fl12.
The reason for doing so was expressed by the Supreme Court again, stating
that it was to ensure that different trial judges reach the same legal conclusion in
cases where there is little factual difference. In the instant case, the circumstances
are not factually different than those found in either State v. Edwards or State v.
Smith in that the three involve the use of a CI to obtain information and entering into
the residence of an accused without the agency first securing a search warrant.
The cases are also similar in that in each, the warrantless search could be
considered a per se Fourth Amendment violation because it is does not fall within
an articulated exception. The warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment
violation unless the State can establish one of the "few specially established and well
delineated exceptions."

See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990)

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L Ed. 2d 576
(1967) (further citations omitted).
Point No. 2
For Warrantless Entry into a Residence to meet Judicial Scrutiny, there
must be Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances.
The use of a CI in entering the residence of a private citizen is not recognized
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as one of the established and well delineated exceptions. The trend has been to
protect the citizen's expectation of privacy. In State v. Beavers, 857 P.2d 9 (Utah
App.1993), the Utah Court of Appeals conducted its assessment of a warrantless
entry as follows:
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "'the right of the people to be secure' in their
persons and houses...against unreasonable searches and seizures. When police
make a seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of
whether the seizure occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)....
Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed, see United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L Ed. 2d 752 (1972). Consequently,
warrantless searches and seizures within the home and other private premises
are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances (citations omitted)."
Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold may not be reasonably crossed
without a warrant. See Peyton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371,
1380, 63 L.Ed. 2d. 639 (1980) (emphasis added).
This Court, in Beavers, went on to clarify that the State bears a particularly
heavy burden of proving that the warrantless entry into a home falls within
established exigent circumstances. Id. In the context of the hot pursuit exception,
this Court stated what it believed to be the general rule, that a warrantless entry of
a private residence must be qualified "by probable cause and exigent
circumstances." Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, a search warrant was never obtained. The CI, acting by
and in behalf of law enforcement, was allowed to enter into the residence and
conduct a controlled buy while under surveillance, which required her to be wired by
Page 15 of

42

other law enforcement officers.
The CI was sent into the residence without corroboration or confirmation that
the Appellant was involved in criminal activity. In other words, the information was
not corroborated through any independent source. There was no established
probable cause. The CI was one who had previously worked with law enforcement
and provided reliable information, but in this case, the information involved
conducting a controlled buy within a residence of a private citizen after entering
without a warrant even though there was sufficient time in which to secure one. The
CI had even failed to disclose the name of Appellant at the time of applying to be a
CI. See the hearing transcript of February 28,2005, at page 34 in the record at 201.
The actions of the CI were in desperation and fear of losing her child and being sent
to prison. Id. at page 16. The CI utilized the manipulative techniques of empathy
and pity to get the Appellant to supply the marijuana. Id. at pages 50 and 51 and 60
and 62. The Appellant involved himself in the transaction to curb what he viewed as
continuing harassment from his friend whom he had an understanding suffered
severely from drug addiction. Id. The problem seems to arise from the fact that law
enforcement allowed the CI to operate without proper direction, supervision or
standards.
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Point No. 3
The Information provided by a typical confidential informant in this setting
is inherently unreliable, which should be more seriously scrutinized by
judicial authority.
The fact that this matter involved a friend of many years, one where their joint
relationship was based upon trust that involved their mutual use of marijuana, calls
into question the fact finder's ability to assess or weigh the pressure or influence
exerted upon the Appellant by simply viewing the matter in the context of their
present contact. There seems to be something fundamentally unfair in a process
that chooses to flatly ignore influence or pressure which is not obvious by the
dialogue of the actors, but does clearly exist beneath the surface as a result of their
long association. It is, however, more unsettling that the process becomes one by
which the CI2 now decides who should be investigated and prosecuted. This is
because the drug task force has empowered her to do so.
The Appellant asserts that this procedure cries out for some type of restraint
to apply the same standard practices and procedures observed uniformly on a

2

In this context, Appellant excludes the CI who is the
concerned citizen who has no vested interest in the enterprise
but volunteers information to the law enforcement agency because
they view it as their duty to do so as a law-abiding citizen
concerned about what they may have inadvertently witnessed.
Conversely, the typical CI who works with the drug task force is
a drug user with a criminal record and reputation for still using
within the drug community.
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statewide basis by law enforcement officers in other areas when such procedures
are scrutinized and/or monitored. Without such, the Appellant maintains that the CI
makes a mockery of the investigative process by tarnishing law enforcement's
reputation of maintaining high standards of integrity and reliability and upon which
the public or jury has come to rely in all aspects, including one of honesty and
propriety.
There simply does not appear to be a compelling reason to distinguish the
actions of an uncontrolled CI as somehow reasonable and proper when law
enforcement itself cannot make such entry, contact or surveillance through their own
use of enhanced techniques, equipment or personnel.
In other words, this is just another form of unlawful search and seizure and
where such evidence is obtained, the appropriate course of action should be to
suppress the evidence.
As articulated by Chief Justice Durham in State v. Larocko, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990) the Supreme Court states:
The principle of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure
should not be admitted at trial was not adopted until relatively recent times in
Utah.... We now expressly hold that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence as a
necessary consequence of police violations of Article I, Section 14. Id. at 472.
In that case, the activity mandating suppression of the evidence was nothing
more than to open an unlocked car door to find the Vehicle Identification Number
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(VIN) when the officer had good reason to suspect that the car had been stolen.
The Court reasoned, which interestingly is no different in the present case,
that since the officer could have easily obtained a warrant for the search of the car,
simply opening the door to inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable search
under Utah law.
The action taken in the instant case is far more intrusive. How one could
consider the action taken by the officer in Larocko as being inappropriate and at the
same time consider the action taken by the CI in this case as being appropriate, is
beyond a sensible explanation. Any distinction appears to be more arbitrary than
well reasoned.
Even if the action taken by the drug task force in using a particular CI appears
sensible and reasonable, where the process itself is subject to manipulation and
selective prosecution where control is entirely in the hands of the CI, the procedure
cannot be condoned. In almost every instance, the activity of the CI is not seriously
questioned, whereas if such conduct or technique were administered by a law
enforcement officer, the same would be closely scrutinized. The double standard
is one that is exploited by law enforcement in the use of special drug task forces, at
least in southern Utah.
In short, law enforcement's use of the CI bypasses significant constitutional
requirements. Under most circumstances, the CI is not even monitored to determine
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whether he or she is complying with the law in other areas as part of their agreement
with the task force. There is evidence of that in this case with other buys made by
the CI unknown to the task force. See the hearing transcript of the 28th day of
February, 2005, at pages 56-57, in the record at 201. Where the CI is left to her own
devices to involve Appellant in a criminal enterprise, the task force is a party to the
operation whether she is acting as their agent or otherwise.

To ignore such

inducement because the same is not under the control of the task force or agency
is like drawing an arbitrary line drawn in the shifting sands of innovative techniques
in police procedure.

The Appellant maintains that if such activity cannot be

maintained within the established practices required of law enforcement, then such
actions should not be condoned as proper or appropriate investigative technique or
procedure when using CIs.
Point No. 4
The Analysis on Agency Misdirects the Focus on the Problem, which is to
not allow Investigative Techniques to delude Fourth Amendment Protection
to Private Citizens.
Most district court judges address this matter not in the context of unwarranted
surveillance but rather as an issue involving agency. That is, whether or not the CI
should be considered an agent of the government, given the circumstances of each
case.

This simply confuses the issue and makes a mockery of fundamental

protections.
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The fact that the CI is acting on her own, more or less as a rogue agent, does
not instill confidence that proper procedures and techniques will be applied in an
investigation. In fact, it flies in the face of it.
An example of this might be noted in the case of State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474
(Ut. App. 1991). In that case, the Court of Appeals discussed the issue of when a
private individual acts as an agent of the government in conducting a search and/or
seizure, stating that the search is a governmental act and must comply with the
Fourth Amendment, see also the United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,113,104
S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984), and Article I, Section 14, of the Utah
Constitution. In Koury, this Court stated that the government cannot use informants
to do for them what they cannot legally do for themselves. See also State v. Watts.
750 P.2d 1219,1220, (Utah 1998). This Court went on to state that when it believes
the person's intended purpose for being in the residence is to perpetrate the interest
of law enforcement rather than preserve his or her own personal interest, then the
person is unquestionably an agent for the State. In the recent unpublished decision
of State v. Edwards, this Court states that the actions of the CI in that case
amounting to enablement to make methamphetamine, were the actions of a private
citizen and not governmental.

In doing so, it flatly ignores the most obvious and

fundamental fact in the case, which is that the CI had an arrangement with the task
force to work for them under contract. This is not the action of a concerned private
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citizen. In Edwards, the CI was operating under the pressure of it being his last
chance to make good on a deal with the task force; that is, to bring someone down
or go back to prison himself. If he had any personal interest to pursue in that
situation, it was to perpetrate the objectives of the task force and keep himself out
of jail. Calling the action personal or governmental does not change matters or help
resolve the issue.
In the instant case, there is no question. The CI testifies accordingly. See
hearing transcript of the 28th day of February, 2005, at page 22, in the record at 201.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the CI made it clear to all that she would
not have been there except for the fact that she was acting on behalf of the task
force. Id.
In Kourv. this Court was clear in stating that law enforcement could not create
its own exigent circumstance in order to justify its warrantless entry. That is exactly
what takes place by sending in a CI to the residence of its target or suspect. See
also State v. Munoz Giarra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986). This is called attenuation.
That is, even if a search is conducted pursuant to a recognized exception as to the
per se rule, such as by permission, it is invalid if it was obtained by law
enforcement's exploitation of some prior illegality, such as the inducement under
false pretense. See State v. Hamm, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996); see also State
v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah App.) cert granted. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
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Can there really be any question that the activity of the CI for the drug task
force in this instance, constitutes an intrusion into the Appellant's home that violates
his right to privacy. Such intrusion mandates that the matter be analyzed in the
context of a warrantless search with a presumption of illegality unless the Court finds
that the officers had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying their
intrusion but not created or exploited by them.
While permission can generally be considered as an exception, the Appellant
argues that it should not apply in this case because the permissive circumstance is
a part of the governmental agency's investigation and is used by the CI to gain entry,
constituting an attenuation of the circumstance. Likewise, the matter can be viewed
from the standpoint that the same is obtained under false pretenses and as a
consequence, the circumstance one exploited by the governmental agency.
Law enforcement should not be allowed to justify what would otherwise be an
illegal entry by exploiting the fact that the CI was allowed to enter the residence
under such false pretenses.

That is to say, law enforcement created the

circumstance, they are not entitled to use it to justify their action for a warrantless
entry.
More importantly, where is the probable cause? The CI clearly states at trial
and at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress that at the time of entry, he
only had suspicion of Appellant's involvement in illegal activity. His prior experience
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with Appellant went back twenty years.

He had mentioned only informal and

infrequent contact with the Appellant in recent years. See the trial transcript at pages
202 to 207 in the record at 239. There was no evidence of prior criminal activity.
Law enforcement had its suspicions, but at this time in their investigation, both the
CI and law enforcement were relying upon the CI's close relationship to the
Appellant to induce him to sell drugs.
In other words, they had no probable cause and would likely not have received
the warrant had the matter been scrutinized by a magistrate. The requirement
should be in place to check the activity and procedure using a CI. Specifically, this
is a procedure that should be scrutinized before entry into a private residence, not
after. To do nothing, and thereby validate such law enforcement activity deludes
the fundamental principles of protection and privacy to a matter of no concern
affording the greater protection to circumstances involving a Terry Frisk or traffic
stop. When the CI has control over the process and the ability to manipulate or
thwart the efforts of law enforcement selectively, the circumstances cry out for
oversight.
The CI, at least those employed in circumstances similar to the instant case
where they are themselves criminals looking to get out from under their own criminal
charges, it becomes a matter of concern to the general public how they go about
setting up people for drug buys. It is because of this concern that the critical part
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the procedure now involves observation, monitoring, and control of their activities.
In a typical situation, the CI is searched prior to being wired and sent into a
controlled buy environment and then searched again afterwards. This is done
because the integrity of the CI is in question. The monitoring is typically by visual
observation by another part of the team and a wire is placed upon the CI among
other things to ensure that the CI does not do or say anything contrary to the
circumstances set in motion by the controlled buy. In other words, the activities of
the CI are monitored, recorded, and controlled in part because they are unreliable.
However, in this case, the CI is given what amounts to carte blanche to go out and
find somebody to set up.
While the task force has the ability to monitor it chooses not to when the CI
is out looking for a target. In fact, those who may know what the asset is capable
of seem to turn a blind eye to allow him to act on his own, more or less as a rogue
agent, to set up who he will in whatever circumstance he might and then to report
back to the task force when he has something useful.
It is the Appellant's contention that this is an open invitation for corruption and
manipulation. This flies in the face of established procedures and controls that have
justified the use of this type of law enforcement technique. More importantly, it
unreasonably puts the public directly at risk by exposing it to the unchecked activities
of individuals who have in the past exhibited a propensity toward criminal activity to
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work the system to their benefit often in blatant disregard to rules, laws and
procedure to which law enforcement would otherwise be subjected.
Ultimately, there is simply no uniformity in the operation from one community
to the next. What might be an accepted practice and basis for procedure in one
district will vary substantially and completely in the next county, community or before
a different judge. If there has ever been a case that seems to cry out for a need for
uniform statewide standards and procedures, it is the use of CIs.
The Appellant contends that whatever minimum standard might be applied on
a statewide basis would at least respect precedent in requiring a search warrant
when such inducement takes place within the residence of a private citizen.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ALLOWANCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION ON
ENTRAPMENT, THE STATE EXPLOITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND THE APPELLANT, WHICH WAS A
LONG-TERM, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP FOR MANY YEARS.
In Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended), the basis
for the entrapment defense is set forth statutorily. The statute focuses on conduct
of law enforcement, by and through its agents, not necessarily the conduct of the
offender. See State v. Belt. 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has found entrapment where the State exploits a
close personal relationship involving inducement by a persistent request, see State
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v. Courvelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), and State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah
1979).
In State v. Spraque. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court
found entrapment where a defendant sold marijuana after persistent requests by an
undercover agent where the agent first approached the defendant with no prior
knowledge that he was involved in drugs and when the defendant testified that he
made the sale in order to be a friend to the police officer.
It is obvious that the Court in that case saw more to the arrangement than
simply the words exchanged or the dialogue between the parties. The relationship
of the parties to each other and the expectations of the parties involved are factors
that can and should be considered. Nevertheless, the standard is clearly whether
the inducement would be effective to persuade a reasonable person to commit an
offense, not just to afford such a person the opportunity to do so. This is clearly
something that is by and large subject to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. That is, the matter is one within the providence of the fact finder
unless so obvious that a judge can see no other possible conclusion from the
evidence.
The Appellant believes that there are some areas of exploitation that are so
clear and obvious that as a matter of law, entrapment should be found since the
same create such a substantial risk that an offense would be committed that there
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is no reason to afford deferential consideration given minor factual distinctions
between cases.
This is another indication as to why clear standards should be established in
the practice and procedure for utilizing CIs. In the instant case, the CI and the
Appellant were close friends of many years. They had associated with each other
in various settings. They shared drugs together back and forth at different periods
of time. Each had provided to the other on various occasions marijuana. They had,
in fact, established a relationship between themselves that was based upon a
foundation of trust and fidelity, not unlike that of fidelity or a relationship between an
employer and employee over a long period of time or in a close family relationship
that is long-term.

The nature of such relationships include factors and

considerations beyond simple words expressed and often involve acts of loyalty and
commitment that are done at the request or benefit of one party for the other without
consideration of personal involvement, risk or sacrifice. Allowing the State to exploit
the nature of that relationship and treat it as though this was a simple acquaintance
along the street turns a blind eye to the strong potential for exploitation. More
importantly, the exploiting factor in the equation again becomes the CI.
Given the practices and procedures exercised by the drug task force at least
in this case, there is no check to ensure that the CI has not manipulated or exploited
the process. One might state that this can be monitored by simply making visual
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observation and electronic monitoring of the CI at the time of the actual sale, but
Appellant argues that such is insufficient and equates to a circumstance no more
convincing than trying to describe the interior of a room by looking through a
keyhole. Many years of a close, continuous relationship between two people, who
at times in their lives considered the other to be a dependable friend, has much more
to it than what is set out as being the conversation between them on the telephone
or at the Appellant's residence, a sum total of about 15 minutes of conversation and
interaction between them on that day. It is a farce to look at that 15 minutes and say
that there is no issue of entrapment raised sufficient to allow an instruction to the jury
on one hand, as in the case of State v. Smith, but yet sufficient to allow for such an
instruction as in this case to be given on entrapment consistent with the statute but
not factoring in consideration of the long-term relationship beyond mere outward
expression.
The real farce is upon the integrity of law enforcement practices and
procedures, which through the years have been established, at least through the
judicial process, of requiring the highest order of conduct within a police
investigation. This undertaking condones the activity of a CI whose actions are at
least asserted by the Appellant in this case to be no different than his own, and
places the reputation of law enforcement upon the same stage and in the same
context of the activities of those they are prosecuting.
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There was no evidence in this case that Appellant was disposed to commit
criminal activity without the involvement of the CI. While the representative from the
task force testified that he had heard nothing regarding this particular Appellant or
his criminal activity and that his name was not one initially disclosed by the CI at the
time she applied for the position, the action for the task force is condoned as though
it was not a party to the transaction but simply there to observe. In this case, the CI
testifies that she would not have been there had it been for her contractual obligation
to the task force and that she was doing this as a last act in saving herself from
being arrested on a probation violation and sent to prison. The Appellant testifies
that several attempts were made by her prior to getting him to sell her marijuana and
on all previous occasions he refused. The Appellant testifies that his reason for
selling her the marijuana on this occasion was because he felt sorry for her and
empathized with what she was going through in dealing with her addiction to
smoking marijuana. The problem in this case is the same as it has been in other
cases. That is, the CI's ability to manipulate the entire process. The CI is pretty
much left to find whoever he or she will to succumb to the purchase of illegal
substances and is allowed to do so without any type of supervision or standard in
which to keep the operation above board. Appellant argues that without such
standards, it is left entirely up to the agency to monitor their CIs as they deem
appropriate but with the inclination toward allowing them to simply set up whoever
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they will and using whatever resources or influence within their control. Moreover,
nothing is corroborated.
In this case, criminal action was initiated by the inducement of the CI based
upon her hunch or suspicion that she could get the Appellant to buy from her. In
Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
Officers of government may afford opportunities to commit crime by employing
artifice and strategists to apprehend persons engaged in criminal enterprise.
However, they cannot implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the offense and to induce its commission in order to prosecute.
That is to say, the focus is not the Appellant's propensity or predisposition as
much as it is upon law enforcement's conduct in their proper use of governmental
power. As stated above, the question becomes whether or not the conduct of the
government comports to a fair and honorable administration of justice. How can
such be accomplished without proper standards or practices established for the use
of CIs. Given that the potential for exploitation, to have no such standards, is the
equivalent of stating that law enforcement places no emphases upon its fair and
honorable administration of justice.

In fact, the approach prevents active

inducements for the purpose of luring a person into the commission of an offense.
The government is not permitted to engage in the manufacturing of a crime such as
occurred with the CI in State v.Edwards. The duty of law enforcement is the
prevention of crime through the apprehension of those who, without inducement, are
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engaged in the commission of criminal activity. Exploiting a long-term relationship
between friends when the CI is in fact the one initiating the purchase of drugs, and
where as evidence suggests that her integrity is questionable, by the CI's prior use
and lack of observation by the drug task force, the judicial authority becomes the
only check on the process. If a CI is allowed to go unchecked, having influence and
power to manipulate and exploit the entire process, she becomes the point to the
sword of the whole law enforcement investigation and the prosecution process. In
short, she is allowed to participate in a criminal enterprise and exonerate herself
from all participation or activity by exposing one of the projects that she helped set
up.
In the present case, the CI is allowed to avoid her own prosecution by setting
up her close friend. In any case, these are not exactly points that lead one to believe
that the information is credible and reliable. Rather, one is struck with a sense that
such motivation for participating in that sort of enterprise causes one to question and
probe beneath the surface to determine whether or not there are extenuating
circumstances.
The Appellant asserts that if there is a situation where the potential for
manipulation is so apparent that the information or participation received or caused
by such activity rises to a level of per se unreliability, then the same should be
treated as entrapment as a matter of law and decided upon by the trial court, not left
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to a jury to consider. More importantly, it demonstrates once again the need for well
defined standards consistent from one jurisdiction to another. How can the use of
such questionable investigative practices be without accepted rules or standards
upon which to operate? If this case stands for anything, it is as another testament
to the potential for corruption and manipulation of the unchecked, uncontrolled or
unsupervised use of CIs, even with law enforcement as a partner, without
established standards and practices and to not compromise the standard of law
enforcement. At the very least, given the circumstances of this case, the trial court
erred in not deciding entrapment as a matter of law and allowing the matter to be
considered by the jury in the form of a jury instruction which did not go beyond the
language utilized in the statute itself. Not giving an informative and comprehensive
jury instruction was the same as informing the jury that it could not consider factors
beyond the most obvious recent communication or expression between the parties
involved.
Having said that, however, Appellant did not object nor take exception to the
instruction given and for that matter may not have preserved the right to challenge
the jury instruction given. Counsel for Appellant believes that the instruction as given
is consistent with the statutory language and, therefore, is correct and proper to the
extent that it is given but fails to consider factors beyond the most obvious exchange
of dialogue or interaction between the parties and does not take into account factors
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that are less obvious and yet present from circumstances that are more long-term
and subtle in nature. As a result, the Appellant believes that the trial court erred in
not finding entrapment as a matter of law or in allowing the jury to decide whether
or not entrapment existed.
C.
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER KOURY AND MCARTHUR ARE
DIFFERENT AND DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF APPELLANT'S
CASE.
Similar to the cases of Edwards and Smith, there was an evidentiary hearing
in this case where it was determined that the CI was a friend of many years to the
Appellant where they would on rare occasions smoke marijuana, the one provided
for the other and vice versa and where the relationship was one based upon trust
and integrity for one toward the other. The Appellant testified that only upon her
persistence did he agree to sell the marijuana to the CI. As with the other cases
mentioned, this one involved her entering into the residence of Appellant and the
same was done without first securing a search warrant but while she was under the
employ or mandate of the regional governmental drug task force. The trial court in
denying Appellant's motion to suppress relied upon this Court's ruling in State v.
McAurthur. 996, P.2d 555 (Ut. App. 2000) and State v. Koury, 824, P.2d 474 (Ut.
App. 1991). Both of those cases stand for the proposition that the fourth amendment
does not protect the wrong doer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
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voluntarily confides his wrong doing will not reveal it. However, the Appellant asserts
that both cases are distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case for
a number of reasons. First, in McArthur, the informant was a person who had
actually been living with the accused and his mother in his mother's home. Even
though she was in the process of moving out of the residence when the officer
approached her and she volunteered to go back to retrieve some of the items she
had identified as being part of the burglary done by the accused, it was a fact that
she had to return to the house to get the rest of her belongings and her permission
to do so had long been established because of her living there.
In Koury. the accused gave the key to his home to a friend to care for his pets
while he was away for a month. In doing so, the friend saw a plant that he thought
to be marijuana and contacted authorities. Law enforcement asked him to retrieve
the plant, which he did because he had permission for an entirely different purpose,
to care for the pets, which allowed entry onto the premises. That is to say, the
obtained permission was not part of a pretext for gaining entry into the residence
anymore than it was a part of the criminal activity, which had happened prior to
permission being given.
In each case, the permission came before the person became a CI This is
distinguishable because even though the CI has been a long-time friend of Appellant
and has in the past been invited into the Appellant's home for activities that included
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illegal drug use, there is no standing order of permission. The CI is attempting to
enter the residence under false pretense acting as a CI for the drug task force, under
contract and having so acted in the past for several weeks and made several
attempts at purchasing buys in a controlled buy situation prior to this event with
Appellant.
Another distinguishing feature that seems to have been lost in the district
court's comparison of the cases to the present case, is that in both McArthur and
Koury, the informants are not part of the criminal activity or enterprise. In both
cases, they are observers after the criminal activity had occurred. In McArthur, it is
not a situation where law enforcement is attempting to induce the accused to commit
a burglary anymore than in Koury is the CI attempting to induce the accused to
cultivate marijuana.

However, in this case, the CI is attempting to induce the

Appellant into a criminal enterprise and is the one initiating the activity. To say that
such an individual is simply providing the opportunity for one disposed to commit
criminal activity ignores the fact that it occurs in the residence of the Appellant,
without a search warrant, under a false pretense and manipulating the long-term
friendship and association of one friend to another. To say that such factors are not
significant in assessing Appellant's decision to participate in such activity, is like
trying to say that sunshine has no effect on how plants grow. While the direct impact
cannot be measured or assessed on the obvious nature of it. It is such that it cannot
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be ignored nor diminished for purposes of assessing its influence or significance.
More importantly, the CI in this case is not simply a passive observer with
information to report. Rather, she is an active participant and, in fact, the primary
force perpetuating the activity. Surely, this Court is correct in asserting that a
wrongdoer should not benefit from volunteering information about his prior criminal
activity to one upon whom he has misplaced his trust. But this case goes far beyond
that. This is a case where a CI induces the Appellant into criminal activity. The
observer is not passively observing. She is inducing. To extend the doctrine of
Koury and McAurthur to include actions of inducement and then call such action
personal instead of governmental and thus of no consequence is just plain wrong.
The issue is not the activity of the accused but the activity of law enforcement in
conducting its investigation that should be scrutinized.
Appellant asserts that it is but another reason why it makes sense to establish
statewide uniform standards and procedures for the use of CIs so that state
investigative techniques and procedures are not compromised by the activities of
unreliable CIs. Had such procedures been in place in this case as is evident from
both Koury and McArthur, where in both a search warrant was in fact secured prior
to arrest, the Appellant believes that the use of CIs would constitute less of a risk to
the public in general, where now it poses a severe risk given the unreliability and
uncontrolled activity of such agents because standards have not been established.
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Appellant further believes that this action will only be instituted at the mandate
of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the trial lasted the better part of a day. The
jury was given several instructions, including an entrapment defense instruction, and
advised to deliberate. The jury returned its verdict after more than ten minutes of
deliberation but within two hours. Certainly, a lot can be inferred from the different
time periods for deliberation. However, the travesty of the circumstance is still the
same that the Appellant was found guilty because the jury it would seem ignored the
evidence presented and from which could be contemplated the impact or effect of
subtle influence in a long-term relationship. There is no question that those on the
watchtower who protect these interests are those that have an understanding of the
problem and a desire to preserve the established constitutional protections. As for
the public at large, the subtleties upon which this Appellant asks this Court to make
distinction seem to be beyond them to understand or appreciate.
D.
GOOD JUDGMENT REQUIRES PROPER PERSPECTIVE.
The matters pending before the Court of Appeals presently include State v.
Edwards, presently under consideration for writ of certiorari, State v. Smith, decision
still pending, and this case, State v. Prestwich. The cases have similar facts and
circumstances which include the use of CIs in various settings, entering into the
home of Appellant without a search warrant, and motions to suppress in each case.
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One case settled prior to trial, and two went to trial, one with an entrapment defense
instruction, this case, and one without, State v. Smith. It is evident from the trial
court's rulings on the motions to suppress, that it relies heavily upon this Court's
decisions in State v. Koury and State v. McArthur.

Depending upon how the

evidence is considered, the trial court's findings are supported in some degree in the
record and testimony. There is, however, a perspective that should be considered.
In many ways, much like it is difficult to see the forest when too close to the trees,
there is much to this case that offers by way of metaphor the problem with the
process. The trial court's decision not to find entrapment in each case or even to
allow the fact finder to be instructed on entrapment as in this present case, comes
from it considering only the immediate transaction that took place between the
parties on the day of purchase while under surveillance. There is some evidence of
harassment, but only from Appellant. What the trial court refused to consider was
the scope, nature or impact of the long-term relationship, which required it to
conclude that such a relationship by its very nature could be equivalent to the same
factors traditionally observed or associated with the traditional entrapment case.
Consequently, since the case did not fit the mold, the trial court did not see the
issue. In fact, it felt that the matter was so implausible that in one case it felt no
need to even allow an instruction on entrapment to be given for the sake of the
Appellant. Appellant would argue that the fact finder should be given the opportunity
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to consider such less than obvious factor the context of an instruction that allows the
fact finder to address every aspect of each circumstance.

Simply giving the

instruction that parrots the statutory language is not sufficient in that it fails to offer
to any jury the kind of consideration that would allow for meaningful deliberation.
While insisting that the State has the ultimate burden of proof in the matter, the
Appellant contends that the trial court should have allowed an instruction of
entrapment that broadened its scope to include consideration of influences beyond
the obvious such as long-term association or friendship. What is clear and obvious
from the Court's rulings is that there seems to be very clearly expressed in these
three cases, an inclination towards supporting the use of CIs by the drug task force
without scrutiny or check and notwithstanding the ramifications in deteriorating fourth
amendment protections such as securing a warrant prior to entny into a dwelling of
an accused. The justification for doing so often falls short of reasonable standards
of expectation at least for practices and procedures of law enforcement but reflect
the belief that to catch a criminal one must become a criminal. The present use of
CIs in this manner seems to be an extension of that kind of dark and twisted
perspective.
The Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals needs to view the matter in a
more appropriate light. It should follow a course to not compromise or reduce the
integrity of law enforcement high standards and continue to enjoy a reputation above
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reproach complying with such standards. Implementing standards for use of CI
throughout the state on a uniform basis would be a step in that direction and allow
for more appropriate oversight with a view toward the continuing protection and
preservation of individual liberties and constitutional rights consistent with the long
established precedent throughout the country. Unless the Court of Appeals is willing
to scrutinize the process and establish such oversight, it is hopeless to assume that
the legislature will take such action and as demonstrated by the jury verdict in this
case, highly unlikely that the public itself will ever fully appreciate the impact of its
application.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests
judgment in his favor reversing or remanding as the Court deems appropriate
together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper.
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August 15, 2006

Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State
Post Office Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Attn: Clerk of the Court
Re: State of Utah v. Gregory L. Prestwich
Appellate Case No. 20060323-CA
Greetings:
This letter is to confirm that an addendum to the above referenced appeal was
intentionally left out and is not needed due to the fact that the record was not cited in
the appeal. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at telephone
number (435)586-8450.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
Very truly yours,

Kirsten Martin
Assistant to J. Bryan Jackson

